POLITICAL FORCES AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE LAND MARKET by Pasour, E.C., Jr.
SOUTHERN JOURNAL  OF AGRICULTURAL  ECONOMICS  JULY, 1977
POLITICAL  FORCES AS A SUBSTITUTE
FOR THE LAND MARKET*
E.  C. Pasour,  Jr.
The  paper by  Long,  Infanger and  Danielson  [5]  problems  "in obtaining answers  to these questions for
(hereafter  referred  to  as  LID)  does  a  good  job  of  enlightened  public  policy"  even  if land use educators
presenting  conventional  rationale  for an  approach  to  had unlimited additional resources.
land use planning.  Survey results  presented  in  the LID
paper  clearly  identify  the  topics  currently  concen-  Nirvana  Approach
trated  upon  in  land  use  research  and  educational  The method  of determining inefficient  land use is
programs.  Identification  of  the  specific  nature  of  one  shortcoming  of  current  educational  programs.
current  educational  programs  in  land  use  is a  neces-  The  conventional  approach  of identifying  inefficient
sary  first  step  in  assessing  the  effectiveness  of  these  resource  use  has  been  described  by  Demsetz  as  the
programs.  The  primary  objective  of this paper  is not  nirvana approach.'  "In practice,  those who adopt the
to  further  review  current  research  and  extension  nirvana  viewpoint  seek  to  discover  discrepancies
activities  but to  take  a fresh look at issues involved  in  between  the  ideal  and  the  real  and,  if discrepancies
land  use  planning,  and point  out  areas  where  both  are found,  they deduce  that the real is inefficient"  [1,
rationale  and  approach  of conventional  research and  p.  1].
extension  land  use  efforts  should  be  subjected  to  Following  statements  from  the  LID  paper illus-
further  scrutiny.  Comments  are not restricted  to the  trate  the  nirvana  approach:  First,  "markets,  in land
LID  paper only,  but relate  also  to described land use  are  inefficient  due  to the  spillover  effects  associated
research and educational  programs.  with  land  use."  Second, "traditional institutions such
as  the  market  do  not  function  well  in  dealing  with
externalities."  A  discrepancy  in  each  case  is  noted
SHORTCOMINGS  OF CURRENT APPROACHES between  the  ideal  and  the  real;  hence,  the  real  is
A  major  thesis  of  the  LID  paper  is  that  land  deduced  to  be  inefficient.  This conclusion,  however,
policy  discussions  have  been  dominated  by the  "how  does  not  follow.  The  relevant  choice  is  between  real
to do it" questions without adequate  consideration of  world institutional  arrangements.  The  statement  that
"what  is  to  be  done,  how  much  is  to  be  done,  for  current  land  markets  are  inefficient  implies  that  an
whom  it  is to  be  done,  by whom, why and when it is  alternative  attainable  real  world  institutional arrange-
to  be  done,  or should it be done at all"  [5,  p. 8]. It is  ment  is  better  able  to  cope  with  land  allocation
fully  agreed  that  the  what,  why,  who,  when  and  problems.  But,  as  is known,  all  institutional  arrange-
related  questions  have  been  given  inadequate  atten-  ments,  political  as  well  as  market,  are  imperfect.
tion.  It  does not seem  feasible,  however,  to  consider  Whether  current  land  markets  are  inefficient  hinges
these  questions  independently  of  the  "how"  ques-  on  whether  there  is  an  alternative  institutional
tion;  all  these  questions  are  interdependent.  Further-  arrangement  better  able  to  cope  with  problems
more,  it  is  shown  below  that  there  are  innate  associated  with land use.
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1The  Nirvana  Approach  is  not  a  conventional  economic  phase.  Nirvana  in  the  Hindu  religion  devotes  freedom  or
emanciation from  care, pain or external reality.
51How  are  the  preceding  comments  related  to  the  local,  state  and  federal  level  frequently  bring about a
LID  paper?  The  authors  explicitly  recognize  that  condition  which,  from the standpoint of advocates  of
market  intervention  may  induce  further  ineffi-  regulation,  is  less  desirable  than  the  situation  the
ciencies:  "there  is  no  guarantee  that  a  given  non-  regulations  were  designed  to alter.  This  result is  well
market approach  developed  in  the political arena will  documented  in  the  case  of  the  CAB,  ICC  and  other
necessarily  be  more  efficient  than  the  free  market  federal  regulatory  agencies.  These  and  other  regula-
approach"  [5,  p. 8].  This  disclaimer  appears  at  the  tory  agencies  in  the  words  of  Stigler  have  been
end  of a  four  page  discussion  entitled  "Can  We  Rely  "captured"  by  the  interests  being  regulated  [13].
Upon  the  Market?"  in  which  the  above  statements  This result is also frequently observed  at the local and
concerning  "market  failure"  appear. The land market  state  levels  for  zoning  boards,  milk  commissions,
as  it  actually  operates  is  implicitly  compared  with  a  occupational  licensing  and  other regulatory  activities.
non-market  or  political  institutional  arrangement  in  The  outcome  of economic  regulation  is to a large
which  the  shortcomings  are  not explicitly  described,  extent,  predestined  by  the  nature  of  the  public
It  is  this  author's  thesis  that  the  choice  between  planning  process  [13].  Although,  public  land  use
market  and  non-market  approaches  to  land  use  planning  ostensibly  is  based  on  widespread  citizen
problems  can  be  intelligently  made  only  after  the  participation,  land  use  planning  in  practice  must  be
land  market  as  it  operates  is  compared  with  state  carried  out  by  agents  of  the  government  bureauc-
imposed  land  use  controls  as political institutions  racy.3 These  decisions  are  reached through a political
actually  operate  in  the  real world.  The  political  or  process  dominated  by  special  interest  groups  with
non-market  forces substituted for market forces  must  narrowly  focused  interests.4 In the  political arena, an
be  analyzed  and  the  probable  outcome  compared  to  individual  must  act  as  part  of an  organized  pressure
the  market  solution  before  the  conclusion  can  be  group  to  be  effective  on  an  issue  affecting  him  (or
drawn  that current land markets are inefficient. 2 her) with  special force.
There  is  a  great  deal  of evidence  to  support the
Problems  of Regulation  contention  that  results  of  economic  regulation  are
The  preceding  discussion  implies  that  a  section  likely  to  be  preverse  [13].  It is incumbent upon us as
was  omitted  from  the  LID  paper  which  would  economists  to  inform the  public  of economic regula-
logically  follow  the  section  "Can  We  Rely  Upon  the  tion  as  it  works  through  the  real  world  political
Market?"  viz,  "Can  We  Rely  Upon  Land  Use  process.  M.  Bruce Johnson,  after analyzing the  effects
Planners?"  Answers  to  the  "how  to  do  it"  and  of  the  California  Coastal  Plan,  holds  that  such
"should it be done at all" questions raised by LID can  non-market  controls  relating  to  land  use  are  "an
be  answered  by  the public only  after they understand  anomaly  at a  time  when major debate  rages  over how
the  probable  outcome  of  land  use  planning  under  to  deregulate-not  further  regulate-the  activities  of
both systems [8].  private citizens"  [3,  p.  189].
What  information  can land use educators provide  Insufficient  attention  to  information  problems
concerning  the  effect  or  outcome  of  non-market  constitutes  a  second  shortcoming  of current land use
approaches  to  land  allocation?  There  is  a  small  but  educational  programs.  The  land  use  problem  as  LID
increasing  body  of evidence  concerning the  effects of  suggest  is a  resource  allocation  problem.  Information
zoning,  coastal  zoning  management,  and  other  gov-  problems  inherent  in  any  system  of  administrative
ernment  regulations  pertaining  to  land  use  [3,  12].  land  use  controls  are  not  widely  discussed,  even  by
The  results  appear  to  be  consistent  with  economic  economists.  These  controls typically  stress land classi-
regulation  in other areas. Many  studies in recent  years  fication  using  technical  data  such  as  soil  type.  Such
have  demonstrated  that government  regulations at the  data,  however,  are  "trivial  in  magnitude  and  impor-
2 "Let  the  following  proposition  be  considered:  there  is not  one single institution  but sometimes  brings  results which  we
should,  if we  knew  all facts, consider evil; and concerning  each we agree that we must accept from  it some evil  for the  sake of the
net  good  it  does.  Who  would dare  maintain  that justice is  in every  case  aided  by  the right  of habeus corpus, by  freedom of the
press,  by  jury  trial,  by  the  institution  of marriage,  by  punishment  of theft  and homicide?  Yet  who  would,  on  account of  the
certainty  that these  systems  often  yield bad results,  advocate  casual  departure  from the rule?  ....  The shortcut to consensus  is
conceptually  clear:  let  those  who  wish  to  depart  from  the  market  system  propose  carefully  conceived  sets  of principles  and
encourage  discussion and criticism  of them"  [9, pp.  459-464].
3 Note  the  rhetoric  concerning  importance  of  widespread  citizen  participation  in  implementing  the North Carolina  Land
Policy  Act.  "Citizen participation in local land use decision-making  is often very limited .. ..  A vigorous effort should be made to
involve  the  public in  preparing  proposed  land classification  maps statewide  ....  The proposed  state land resources  commission
should be  responsible  for ensuring that adequate  public participation exists in all state land use related programs"  [6, pp. 3-1 and
3-2].  Problems  endemic  in  determining,  coordinating  and  transmitting  information  through the political  process are  discussed
below.
4"Thus  it  is  not surprising  that EPA would be dominated by Sierra Club interests,  and the Civil Aeronautics  Board by airline
company  interests"  [3,  p.  20].
52tance  when compared  to  the  information  required  to  The  problem lies not with  the particular language
carry  out  the  ordinary  processes  of  economic  in  the  land  use  planning  document  cited,  but  is
activity-knowledge  of  the  particular  circumstances  inherent  in  the  process  of  allocating  resources
of time  and place"  [3, p.  52].  through  the  political  mechanism.  The  basic  problem
The  market has long been recognized  as a way of  in  allocating  any  resource  by non-market  procedures
coordinating  and communicating  information held by  is  that  alluded  to  above,  viz,  that  of  obtaining  and
large  numbers  of people  [2].  Knowledge  about  land  utilizing  knowledge  of  all  affected  members  of
(and  other  resources)  never  exists  in  concentrated  society  for ends whose  relative  importance only  those
form  or  in  a  single  mind.  This  presents  the  basic  individuals  know.  When  one  considers  the  vast
economic  problem  facing  society. How can  we secure  amount  of  subjective  information  inherent  in  and
the  best  use  of  our  land  (and  other)  resources  affecting  the  typical  market  exchange,  it  is  not
utilizing  the  knowledge  of all  members of society for  surprising that land use  planning documents stress soil
ends  whose  relative  importance  only these individuals  types  and  other objective  data.  It is  incumbent upon
know?  "Or,  to put  it  briefly,  it is  a problem  of the  land use  economists  to point out the  problems  faced
utilization  of knowledge  which  is not given to anyone  when  land  allocation  decisions  are  made  by  non-
in  its totality"  [2, p. 78].  market methods.
In  the  absence  of  externalities  the  market  pro-
vides  a  dependable  way of valuing land for alternative
uses.  Market  prices  provide  the means of meshing the  WHAT CAN ECONOMISTS  DO?
wants  and  information  of  all  people  in  the  market.  Another  shortcoming  for  current  land  use  re-
Although  the  problem  of  external  effects  certainly  search  and  extension  activities  is  that  our reach  far
exists,  there  is no  strong prima facie reason  to expect  exceeds  our  grasp.  Economists  have  done a great deal
external  effects  to  be  reduced  when  land  use  deci-  of  useful  work  as  LID  suggest  in  taxation,  price
sions  are made  through  the  political process [3].  analysis,  public  finance  and  other  topics  relating  to
Land  use  planners  have  no way to determine and  land  use.  The  economist,  however,  cannot do  many
utilize  the  knowledge  of all  persons  affected  by  land  of  the  things  proposed.  The  LID  paper  suggests,  for
use  decisions.  Specifically, what criterion will be  used  example,  that  with  sufficient  research  a  land  use
in  allocating land  to  different  uses  under non-market  policy  can  be  developed  which  meets  "the  public
land  use controls?  If there  are  still economists not yet  interest."  Yet, there  is no way for us  as economists to
convinced that this is a problem I recommend  a study  empirically  determine  the  public  interest  in  land
of land use control legislation  and regulations.  policy  (or  in  any  other  area).  All  political  decisions
Administrative  land  use  control  regulations  are  confer  benefits  on some  people  and  losses  on  others
permeated  with  vague  and  ambiguous  language.  Con-  and  we  have  no  objective  way  to  compare  these
sider  the  following  proposal  developed  by  the  N.  C.  benefits  and  losses.  The  public  interest,  in  practice,
Land  Policy  Council  in  implementing  the  North  tends  to  be  the  interest  of  those  who  speak  in  the
Carolina Land  Policy  Act of  1974.  "It  is state policy  name of the public.6
that  naturally  productive  lands  not  be  converted  to  Knight  contends  that  the  function  of economics
non-agricultural  uses  where  alternative  lands  are  is to  guide,  or at least illuminate,  the making of 'rules
available"  [6,  p.2-3].5  Who  is  to  decide  what  of  the  game,'  in  the  shape  of  law,  for  economic
"naturally  productive  lands  are"  and  whether  "alter-  relationships  [4,  p.  174]. What  does this imply about
native  lands  are  available?"  What are  the implications  obtaining answers to the  why, how, whom, where and
of  such  a  policy?  Alternatives  or  substitutes  are  how much  type of questions related to land use? The
always  available  at some  price.  Demand  curves  aren't  major  economic  problem  relating  to  land  use  is
perfectly  inelastic  for  agricultural  land  or  for  any  similar  to  that  for  any  other  resource,  viz,  that "of
other resource.  rapid  adaption  to  changes  in  the  particular  circum-
5This  is only  one  of many examples which could be cited from the same document.  Consider another example:  "Guidelines
for local land  classification plans should  specifically require  that  only after  a full consideration  of  the needs  of the community
and an exhaustive  search for other suitable lands may productive land be planned  for non-agricultural  uses"  [6, pp.  2-3] .
6The  North  Carolina  Land use  planning  document  cites  public interest  as  the criterion  for  making changes  in land use. "Is
land classification  a  one-shot  inflexible  plan?  No, land classification  plans once prepared  will  be updated  and refined  every  five
years.  In  addition land  classification  plans  may  be  amended  at  any  time if the petitioner,  whether-a  unit  of government  or a
private  interest,  can demonstrate  that  such a  change  to  the plan would be in the public interest"  [6, pp.  4-5].  When land may be
used  for  widely  different purposes,  how  could one  establish that any change in land use is in  the "public interest especially when
the method  of allocating land  is arbitrary  and imprecise?"  The arbitrary  nature of land classification  in  the North Carolina Land
Policy  Act  is acknowledged  in the  same  document:  "Judgment  will  necessarily  play  a major role in assigning lands to one  of the
five land  classes"  [6, pp. 4-7] .
53stances  of time  and place . . ." [2, p.  83].  How  is this  makes  both  parties  better  off.  There  is  no  conflict
related  to  the  issue  of  market  vs.  non-market  between  self-interest  and  public duty  associated with
approaches to land use planning? Where  knowledge of  such  exchange.  When  allocative  decisions  are  made
relevant  facts  about  land  is  dispersed  among  many  collectively,  however,  the  situation is different. Then,
people,  market  prices  act  to  coordinate  separate  as  LID  point  out  "every  allocative  decision  must
actions of different people.  address  the  questions  of  what  is  to  be  allocated,  to
There  is  a consensus  among  economists  that  the  what uses,  and  who is  to  benefit  and who  is to lose"
market  will  efficiently  allocate  land  (and  other)  [5,  p.  3].  An  increased  reliance  on  non-market
resources  when  market  prices  reflect  the  correct  allocation  methods  will  inevitably  increase  tension
social  costs  and  benefits.  If  markets  generate  the  between  self-interest  and  public duty.7 It is  predict-
wrong  prices,  we  may  get  too  much  pollution,  too  able  that  increasing  the  sphere  of  political  activity,
little  open  space,  etc.  A  major  thrust  of  "land  use  i.e.,  reducing  private  property  rights  in  land  use
planning"  is  to  substitute  centralized  authority  for  decisions,  will  increase  land use  conflicts.8 The  most
the decentralized  market  in  allocating land resources.  obvious  and  extreme  example  occurs  when  private
The  argument  for substituting administrative  land use  property  rights  are  abolished  and land  is  treated  as  a
controls  implicitly  assumes  that  the central authority  common property  resource.
will  be  able  to  discover,  announce  and  enforce
socially  correct  allocation  of land  [3,  p.  190].  This
raises  another  question  in  addition  to  the  questions  IMPLICATIONS  AND CONCLUSIONS
already  cited  concerning  externalities  associated  with  The  crucial  issue  in  land  use  conflicts,  as  LID
administrative  land  use  controls.  Why  do  land  use  suggest,  is  property  rights.  Why  have property  rights
regulations  apply  to  all  land  and  not  just  those  not  received  more  attention  by  land  use  educators?
involving significant  spillovers?  The  subject  of property  is complex  and  the  relation-
Knight  has  characterized  the  social  problem  as  ship  between  property  rights  and  internalizing  spill-
that  of  establishing  a  social  consensus  on matters  of  overs  is  not fully  understood  even  by economists.  If
policy  [4,  p.  174].  What  role  can the economist play  land use  educators  are  to help answer the how,  what,
in  achieving  this  social  consensus?  Sir  Dennis  who,  why,  when and related  questions as suggested in
Robertson,  in  contending  that  the economist  should  the  LID  paper,  more  attention  must be  given  to  the
suggest  ways  to  minimize  use of the  scarce  resource  property  rights question.
love, provides an insight:  Planning  begins  with  information.  Then  what,
"There  exists  in  every  human  breast  an  why,  who,  when and  related  questions  raised by LID
inevitable  state  of tension  between  the aggressive  cannot  be  separated  from  the  how  question.  Data
and  acquisitive  instincts  and  the  instincts  of  relevant  to  determining  what land  is  used  for,  how
benevolence  and  self-sacrifice  ...  It  is  his  (the  much is  used for particular purposes, who is to use it,
economists')  function  to  emit a  warning  bark  if  and  when  it  is to  be  used are  closely related  to how
he  sees  courses  of  action  being  advocated  or  land  use  decisions  are made.  Knowledge problems are
pursued  which  will  increase  unnecessarily  the  endemic  in  non-market  allocation  procedures.  There
inevitable  tension  between  self-interest  and  is  little  or  no  evidence  that  knowledge  of particular
public  duty;  and  to  wag  his  tail  in  approval  of  circumstances  of time and place  as related to land use
courses  of  action  which  will  tend  to  keep  the  can  ever  be  determined  and transmitted  through  the
tension  low and tolerable"  [11, pp.  148-149].  political  process  as  effectively  as  through  a  decen-
A  comparison  of  the  effects  of  market  and  tralized market. We,  as economists, have  an obligation
non-market  allocation  procedures  illustrates  to  point  out  imperfections  and  shortcomings  of the
Robertson's  point.  Any  voluntary  market  exchange  collective  choice  process  as  a way  of allocating  land
7Price  controls  and wage-price  guidelines are good examples. The decision-maker has no reliable basis upon which to base his
actions when  price signals  are ignored regardless  of  whether the inattention to  price signals is voluntary  or legally mandated [7,
1973].  Consider  the shortage  created  by  price controls  on natural gas  during the  winter of 1976-1977. How could the "socially
concerned" homeowner  decide  whether to heat his home to 68°F or 55
0F (or even lower)?
8Philbrook  agrees  with  Robertson that  the economist  should attempt  to economize  love  and  sees the market  as  playing a
central  role  in  achieving  that goal.  ". ..free  enterprise,  bad  as it  is  in comparison  to  our dreams,  seems to  offer possibilities  of
embodying  more  of the rule of love than we so far see how to embody in any different system  ....  Thus the thing to be guarded,
even at tremendous  cost if  necessary,  is freedom,  in the  common-sense  meaning  of freedom from arbitrary dictation to one soul
by another....  We  must  not, then guide  action  by decisions made  by  uneasy  (or even  easy)  compromise  among  the fifty-one
percent and forced upon the forty-nine, except  where there is simply no other way  available. What the rule of love  calls for above
all  surely  is  non-interference  with  the  quest  (for  the good life).  Decisions must  stem from the tastes  and  ideals of men,  freely
developed  and  freely  expressed.  ...  The  same set of institutions  which  permits conspicuous  consumption assures that an Albert
Schweitzer  will  not be  deflected  from  his destiny  by  some  administrator who  believes  that the morale  of the people  calls  for
Schweitzer's music"  [9, pp. 464-466].
54resources  in the same  way that we  point out spillovers  types  of  work  are  respected  and  supported  in
associated  with current land markets.  universities"  [10,  p.  847].  What  should  be  our
Finally,  a  word  on  realism  as  it  affects  land use  posture  toward realism  as it influences  land use  policy
research  and educational  efforts.  Land use economists  proposals?  To again quote  Philbrook:  "Only  one type
sometimes  feel  constrained  by  realism  considerations  of  serious  defense of a policy  is open  to an economist
in  pointing  out  problems  inherent  in  non-market  or  anyone  else:  he  must  maintain  that the  policy  is
resource  allocation  procedures.  It is  easy  to  take  the  good.  True  'realism'  is  the  same  thing  men  have
position  that  comprehensive  land  use  planning  is "an  always  meant  by  wisdom:  to decide  the immediate  in
idea whose time  has come"  and  that it is "unrealistic"  the  light  of the  ultimate.  The  economist must follow
not  to  accept  this  fact.  Why  waste  time  on  sugges-  this  ideal  as  best  he  can-in humility and in readiness
tions  which  have  little  chance  of  acceptance?  As  to  compare  notions both of technical relations and of
Philbrook  states:  "The  charge  of  'unrealism'  is  used  ultimate  values"  [10,  p.  859].  In  view of complexi-
with  telling  effect  to  discredit  policy  recommenda-  ties  in  the  land policy  area,  I  fully  concur  with LID
tions  without  adequate  consideration.  It  probably  and Philbrook that land use  specialists should proceed
affects  in  no  small  degree  the  determination  of what  cautiously.
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